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UP TO PAR: GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT OF QUALITY
CONTROL IN THE GOLF BALL REFURBISHMENT INDUSTRY
James Karins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

From knockoff Rolexes to Chanel bags, New York City's Canal Street has been the
home of counterfeit goods since the 1980's.1 Merchants who pass these products off as
genuine are often subject to criminal penalties.2 A loophole in the law; however, has given a
subtler practice of trademark infringement for refurbishment the stamp of judicial approval.3
Suppose the "100% authentic" watches had once been a genuine Rolex, but the exterior was
scratched and the interior machinery needed tuning. To avoid the expense of tuning the
watch up to Rolex's standards, the street vendor replaces the interior machinery with that of a
far inferior watch. The street vendor then sells the final product as a "used" Rolex with
Rolex's trademarks affixed. They tell customers that the watch has been refurbished.
Assuming the vendor means that the exterior has been cleaned and polished, the customer
purchases the watch under the assumption that it will still function as a used Rolex should.
To the customer's dismay, it is impossible to see the watch's true defects and its performance
woefully disappoints. Once Rolex discovers what the vendor has been doing, they sue to
enjoin this practice. After litigating their case, the judge finds no issue with what the vendor
has been doing.
Unfortunately, high-end golf ball manufacturers have found themselves in this exact
situation.4 They have honed their craft for decades, producing the highest quality products,
only to have their trademark rights judicially stripped.s This note will highlight trademark
rights issues that have arisen in the golf ball refurbishment industry. Refurbishment
companies, also referred to as remanufacturing companies, 6 have been violating original
manufacturer's trademark rights for years.7 To illustrate this phenomenon, this note centers
upon the Federal Circuit decision Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet.8 The court

* The author would like to thank Bhanuka Mahabamunuge and Professor Kevin McElroy for their drafting
assistance.
1 Alice Hines, Knockoff Another Day at the Office - on Canal Street with Counterfeit Vendors, THE VILLAGE

VOICE (May 18, 2016), https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/05/18/knockoff-another-day-at-the-office-oncanal-street-with-counterfeit-vendors/.
2 Id. (Nine hundred and sixty-seven people were arrested for misdemeanor trademark counterfeiting in the
precincts surrounding Canal Street in 2008 alone, with 257 arrests more recently in 2015).
3 Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (F. Cir. 2003).
4 Id. at 1358-59.
5 See id. at 1365, 1369-70; see also ACUSHNET HOLDINGS CORP., https.//www.acushnetholdingscorp.com (last
visited Sept. 7, 2019).
6 REMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES COUNCIL, http://www.remancouncil.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
Third Amended Complaint, Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (F. Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-14008) (explaining that the business of recycling and refurbishing golf balls has existed within the
United States for decades).
8 NitroLeisure Products, 341 F.3d 1356.
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9
adopted the improper Champion standard as opposed to the Davidoffstandard. The case was
wrongly decided against the principles of trademark law. It eviscerates a trademark's value,
10 The Nitro
and thus sets dangerous precedent for the refurbishment industry as a whole.
decision allows refurbishment companies to profit off of the good will cultivated by
trademark owners.'" Its legal and financial ramifications affect other remanufacturing
industries. 2 - The Federal Circuit erroneously relied on an outdated Supreme Court decision,
Champion, despite defendant Nitro's clear violation of the rule set forth in that case." The
Court should have relied on the rule set forth in Davidoff which more adequately addresses
4
the issues presented by the modem refurbishing industry.
The Davidoff rule comports with the principles of trademark law more neatly than
Champion." This rule was most applicable to the Nitro case, because the existing Champion
rule does not protect the right to quality control. Therefore, an amendment to the Lanham Act
is necessary." My proposed amendment will be twofold: first, it will follow Davidoff's rule
specifying when a trademark may remain affixed to a refurbished product using the material
difference test.' 7 Second, it will require refurbishment companies to obtain a licensing
agreement before re-affixing the original trademarks to remanufactured products that are
8
materially different.'

9 See id. at 1366, 1369 (Newman J. dissenting); see also Michael A. Goldstein, Time for A Mulligan? How A
Questionable2003 FederalCircuitDecision Has PromptedA Needfor Reform in the Refurbishing Industry, 22
FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 245, 260-261 (2012).
10 See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 259-260.

1" See I J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §§ 2:15, 2:22 (5th ed. 2019)
(McCarthy finds that trademarks are a symbol of good will. This good will is inseparable from the mark, and
trademark remedies are designed to protect the mark as well as the good will attached to it). See J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, About the Author (5th ed.) (J. Thomas McCarthy

is a Professor Emeritus at the University of San Francisco School of Law, has written and taught in the field of
trademarks and unfair competition for over 50 years, and was a member of the A.L.I. Advisory Committee
involved in drafting the 1995 Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition).
12 See REMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES COUNCIL, supra note 6 (estimating that the United States produces
more than 45 billion dollars of remanufactured goods per yea; and that remanufacturing could generate £75
billion by 2030); see also John Chalifoux, Remanufacturing Industry Briefing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

AND

THE

STANDARDS

ALLIANCE

(Dec.

7,

2016)

https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%2Activities/International%2OStandardization/Standar
ds%20AIliance/ANDEANMexican%20Delegation%2OVisit/Powerpoints/Day%203/MEMA/Remanufacturing
%20Industry%2OBriefing12-07-2016.pdf ("U.S. production of remanufactured goods.. totaled at least USD
43.0 billion in 201 1.").
13 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947); see also Brief for Defendant-Appellant,
Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (F. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1572) (Acusbnet
correctly argued in its brief for the Federal Circuit that the exceptions from the Champion rule were met).
14 Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Intern. Corp., 263 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2001).
15 See Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356 (Newman, J. dissenting).
16 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 2018) (The Lanham Act governs trademark law in the
United States).
17 See Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297.
1 Part of the amendment should include a provision by which refurbishment companies may obtain a
compulsory license from the trademark holder to further the licensor and licensee's business interests.
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II.

BACKGROUND ON GOLF BALL REFURBISHMENT AND TRADEMARK LAW PRINCIPLES

A.

Background on Refurbishing

Approximately 100 million golf balls are lost around golf courses every year.
These golf balls are salvaged by golf ball divers or collectors,20 and then the balls are either
cleaned or refurbished. 2 1 Major golf ball manufacturers have no issue with washing and
reselling used golf balls; their concern arises with the refurbishing process. 22 Secondhand
companies, such as Nitro, use chemicals to strip away the outer layers of the golf ball.2 3
Then, without the original manufacturer's permission or oversight, they refinish the ball with
paint and clear coat before re-affixing the original trademark on the golf ball. 24 Golf ball
manufacturers know that their products are carefully crafted goods, so even slight alterations
to the exterior of the balls create "vastly different goods." 25
After cleaning or reconstruction, the balls are typically sorted by brand or condition
then resold.2 6 Some ball collectors sell wholesale to large refurbishment companies, while
others resell the golf balls themselves on auction websites like eBay. 27 Other refurbishing
companies refurbish golf balls and sell them online in greater quantities.28 In an industry that
generates $200 million annually, refurbishment companies stand to tremendously profit.2 9
However, high-end golf ball producers like Acushnet, the owner of Titleist, are particularly
vulnerable.30 Their products typically retail for $2 each after refurbishment,3 ' whereas
average golf balls retail for about 70 cents.3 2

'9 See Josh Sens, Diving for Used Golf Balls, the Most DangerousJob in Golf GOLF.COM (Jan. 21, 2013),
https://www.golf.com/tour-and-news/divers-make-living-diving-used-golf-balls-golf-courses/2/.
20 Id. (Sens follows a golf ball collector who uses scuba gear to collect balls lost in water hazards. This type of
collector is often referred to as a "diver." Divers can even earn a six-figure salary).
21 See Brieffor Defendant-Appellant, Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C.,
341 F.3d 1356 (F. Cir. 2003) (No. 021572) 2002 WL 34579558.
22 Id.
23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. (Nitro's processes for refurbishing golf balls was "wholly unacceptable under Acushnet's established
quality standards," and "Nitro's process imparts characteristics Acushnet never gave the balls and never
intended the balls to have.").
26 See Steve Gillman, You Won't Believe How Much Money You Can Earn by Collecting Used GolfBalls, THE
PENNY HOARDER (June 17, 2014), https://www.thepennyboarder.com/make-money/side-gigs/wont-believemuch-can-earn-collecting-lost-golf-balls/.
27 Id.

28 See LOsTGoLFBALLS.coM, https://www.lostgolfballs.com/ (last visited Oct. 1,
ROCKBOTTOMGOLF.COM, https://www.rockbottomgolf.com/ (last visited Oct 1, 2018).
29 Gillman, supra note 26, at 1.
30 See TITLEIST, https://www.titleist.com/my-titleist/golf-balls (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
31 Sens, supra note 19, at 2.
32 Gillman, supra note
26, at 2.

2018);

see also
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B.

Trademark Law Principles and The Lanham Act

Trademarks are a universal legal phenomenon because almost every nation in the
world recognizes some form of identification of the source and quality of goods." Unlike
34
Lanham Act
patents and copyrights, federal trademark law does not preempt state law.
and
of
substantive
wealth
a
governs trademark law in the United States, which provides
35
in
used
devices
or
symbols,
names,
It defines trademarks as any words,
procedural rights.
or
sold
those
from
goods
their
commerce to identify the source of the goods and to distinguish
3
manufactured by others. 6 The Act has two basic goals. ' First, to inspire consumer
Second, to protect the owner's property rights in a
confidence in the reputation of a mark.
mark from misappropriation when they spend time, energy and money on developing the
39
mark and the quality of the product for which it stands.
and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the
Patent
States
In order to register with the United
40
qualify as a trademark under the
must
following five criteria must be met: (1) The mark
4
in commerce,"'4 2 (3) the mark
"used
Lanham Act's definition, 1 (2) the mark must have been
43
must have been attached to or included with the goods, (4) the applicant must provide the
45
PTO with certain facts,4 4 and (5) the mark cannot fall within one of the statutory bars.
Because trademarks must be distinguishable from others, marks must be categorized by their
46
strength to determine the appropriate level of protection. . Stronger marks are entitled to a
47
Marks are classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive,
greater degree of legal protection.
49
48
Suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are inherently distinctive.
arbitrary or fanciful.
Fanciful marks are created for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark, and have no

3

1 McCarthy, supra note 11,

34 3 McCarthy, supra note 11,

§ 2:6.
§ 22:1.

" 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127.
36 Id., § 1127.
See 1 McCarthy, supra note 11, §§ 2:2, 11:27.
See I McCarthy, supra note 11, § 2:2.
39 Id.
40 See 3 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 19:10.
37
3

41 Id.

Id. § 19:108 ("Used in commerce" means the goods were part of a bona fide sale in interstate commerce.
The sale cannot be a "token" sale made with the intent to reserve trademark rights).
43 Id. (The mark may also be included on a display near the goods).
4 See id. § 19:10 (These facts include but are not limited to: the mark's first date of use, the goods it is used
on, and a drawing of the mark); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051(a)(2).
45 15 U.S.C.A. § 1052 (Statutory bars are listed). Parts of subsection (a) have been held unconstitutional; see
Matal v. Tam 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017) (invalidating subsection (a)'s disparagement clause).
46 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
4 See 2 McCarthy, supra note 11, §§ 11:4, 11:73 (The stronger the mark, the more likely encroachment on the
mark will constitute infringement).
48 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (Generic marks, which refer to the "genus of which the particular product is
a species," are not registerable. Descriptive marks are generally not entitled to protection but may qualify if
they acquire distinctiveness).
49 See 2 McCarthy, supra note II, § 11:4 (An "arbitrary mark" is a word that is commonly used in the
language but does not suggest the quality of the goods (i.e. "Apple" for computers). "Suggestive" marks are
those which suggest, but do not directly describe the goods).
42
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meaning aside from acting as the mark.o They are entitled to the highest degree of legal
protection.s Owners of trademarks that fail to protect their mark from infringement run the
risk of losing future protection because courts deem unprotected marks as "abandoned." 52
Abandoned marks are not protected because their use is deemed generic. 53
Trademarks symbolize the good will attached to a product by the mark's owner.5
This good will is inseparable from the mark, and trademark remedies are designed to protect
the mark as well as the good will attached to it.55 Further, the presence of a trademark
ordinarily indicates to consumers that the mark owner has concluded the goods are of
sufficient quality to bear the mark.
One of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the
Lanham Act is the right to control the quality of the goods manufactured
and sold under the holder's trademark. For this purpose[,] the actual
quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of quality that a
trademark holder is entitled to maintain.5 7
A trademark is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property because it is
the right to exclude others from using the mark.58 In fact, one of the Lanham Act's
fundamental goals is to prevent mark owners from losing control over goods bearing their
trademark.59
C.

Types of Infringement

In the remanufacturing context, refurbishment companies are subject to liability for
goods bearing the original manufacturer's trademark, if the goods are (1) refurbished and do
not comport with the original manufacturer's standards, and (2) are likely to confuse
consumers about whether the original manufacturer approved of the good's quality. 0 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (the "Restatement") refers to these products as
"counterfeit goods." 6 1

so See Strength of Trademarks, BITLAW, https://www.bitlaw.com/trademark/degrees.html (last visited Sep. 14,
2018).
st See John H. Harland Co. v. Clark Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983).
52 See Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
s3 Id.; see also Murphy Door Bed Co., v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989).
5 See 1 McCarthy, supra note 11, §§ 2:15, 2:22, 6:3.
56
5

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. C (AM. LAW. INST. 1995).
El Greco Leather Products Co., Inc. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2nd Cir. 1986).

s8 5 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 30:1.
5 See Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir. 1992).
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56,

§ 24.

Id. Compare Professor McCarthy's definition of counterfeit: goods bearing a false mark that is identical
with the genuine mark; 2 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 11:73.
61
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Mark filers enforce their rights by filing a trademark infringement claim against a
62
The plaintiff must show that the mark
party they believe is misappropriating their mark.
was used in commerce without the registrant's consent, as well as a likelihood of consumer
confusion, deception, or mistake to prove a prima facie case of trademark infringement."
Consumers may be confused about whether the original manufacturer and the infringer's
business are associated, whether the infringer's goods are certified by the original
manufacturer, or whether the infringer has certified the original manufacturer's goods.6
65
Confusion can be found at the time of sale or post-sale. As a general rule, confusion may be
66
Confusion
established by first impressions, luring of consumers or overall impressions.
should be measured based on an initial understanding, rather than an understanding after
reading the package.6 ' Although evidence of confusion is often difficult to acquire, it takes
68
little evidence to establish this factor. In fact, evidence of actual confusion is instrumental
69
in satisfying the likelihood of confusion element and is ordinarily decisive.
When deciding whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit looks at seven factors: (1) type of mark, (2) similarity of
mark, (3) similarity of products the marks represent, (4) similarity of parties' retail outlets,
trade channels and customers, (5) similarity of advertising media, (6) defendant's intent, and
(7) actual confusion. 7 0 The most important factors are the nature of the mark and the
defendant's intent.7 The plaintiff does not need to show all seven elements to establish a
prima facie claim.7 2
Infringement is a popular cause of action for mark owners, but mark owners may
also file a claim for dilution. Dilution occurs when a famous mark is used in commerce and
that use is likely to cause blurring or tarnishment, regardless of consumer confusion or

62

63

15 U.S.C.A.§ 1117 (West 2018).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 20 cmt. D; see also McDonald's Corp. v.

Robinson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 56, § 20 cmt. D; see also Opticians Ass'n of
Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (Courts have found likelihood of confusion to be
inevitable when an identical mark is used concurrently by unrelated entities).
6s Charles E. McKinney & George F. Long III, FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43(A) § 3:9
(2019) (When there are no distinguishing indicia present after the product has been removed from its
packaging, labels or tags the likelihood of confusion test should be made under such post-sale conditions.
Notably, it is highly likely that Nitro's refurbished golf balls will fall victim to an errant tee shot and be found
by other golfers. Under these conditions, the golfer finding the refurbished product will assign blame for
Nitro's subpar quality goods to Acushnet).
66 Id. at § 3:11.
67 Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
61 Id. at 1216.
69 See Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sci. Corp., No. 96-2709--CIV-NESBITT, 1997 WL 244746 at *4
(S.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmt. B (AM. LAW. INST.
1995)).
70 See Frehling Enter., Inc. v. Int'l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999).
71 See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Princeton Pharm., Inc., No. 88-6527, 1990 WL 272707 at *6 (S.D. Fla.
1990).
'

72

id.

7

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).
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economic injury.74 Dilution is different from infringement because dilution does not require a
showing of consumer confusion.
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, an expert in trademark
law, found that dilution occurs when there is a weakening or reduction in the ability of a mark
to clearly distinguish only one source. 76
"Blurring" is defined as an association that arises from the similarity of a mark and a
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.7 7 The plaintiff must show
the following to prove a "dilution by blurring" claim: (1) their mark is famous; (2) the
defendant registered its mark after the plaintiff; (3) the defendant diluted the plaintiff s mark;
and (4) the defendant's use is commercial and in commerce.
"Famous" means that the mark must contain a degree of distinctiveness and strength
beyond that of a normal. trademark, it must be truly prominent and renowned.79 Dilution itself
may be proven by examining any relevant factor, including the following: the degree of
similarity between the mark and the famous mark; the degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness of the famous mark; the degree in which the famous mark's owner is using the
mark exclusively; whether the user of the mark intended to create an association with the
famous mark; and any actual association between the mark and the famous mark."
The other variety of dilution is called "tamishment."8' A claim of tarnishment
requires evidence of an association arising from a similarity between a mark and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.8 2
In the United States, dilution is bound to two categories: blurring or tarnishment.83
However, speculation exists that there may be another variety of dilution. 84 Judge Posner

7

Id.; see also Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (Prior to the 2006

amendment, the Supreme Court read the Lanham Act to require proof of actual dilution, not just likelihood of
dilution. After that case was decided, the Lanham Act was amended to require likelihood of dilution and
affirmed); see Levi Strauss & Co., v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011); see
also Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356 (The Victoria's Secret decision affected the Federal
Circuit's decision in Nitro because the Victoria's Secret case was decided during the pendency of Nitro, and
Acushnet could not show actual dilution).
7s See 4 McCarthy, supra note 11, at §24:67.
76 id.~
n Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B) ("The legal theory of dilution by blurring says that if customers or
prospective customers see the plaintiffs famous mark used by other persons in a non-confusing way to identify
other sources for many different goods and services, then the ability of the famous mark to clearly identify and
distinguish only one source might be "diluted" or weakened.").
7
Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
79 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (The Lanham Act gives four factors to consider when determining
whether the mark is famous: (i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the
mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on
the principal register. Courts have simplified this to mean: "To be inherently distinctive, a mark must 'clearly
be more than just distinctive in a trademark sense' and must rise to the level of 'Buick' or 'Kodak); see also
Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc., 994 F.Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (quoting 4
McCarthy, supra note 11, § 24:92).
so 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
* Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(C).
8 Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(C).
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speculated there may be a residual form of dilution apart from blurring and tarnishment that is
Posner argued that there
triggered by a junior user taking a free ride on a famous trademark."
86
Riding is not about the
Free
riding.
free
of
kind
this
banning
for
reasons
economic
are good
the
defendant.87 European
of
enrichment
unjust
the
it
is
rather,
damage to the famous mark,
law expressly prohibits dilution and free riding, whereas the Lanham Act only prohibits
88
dilution: where injury to the plaintiff s famous mark is required.
D.

Trademark Infringement Remedies

Trademark owners who enforce their rights are entitled to damages and injunctive
relief.89 However, the standard remedy for infringement and dilution is an injunction because
To issue a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must
monetary relief is inadequate.90
demonstrate: (1) it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) monetary damages are inadequate
relief; (3) that, considering a balance of hardship between plaintiff and defendant, an
injunction is warranted; and (4) the injunction will not be a disservice to the public's
interest. 91 However, while a trademark infringement case is pending, a plaintiff may seek a
preliminary injunction. 92 Although the standards vary significantly from circuit to circuit,
McCarthy finds five factors that the plaintiff must show which generally warrant preliminary
injunction: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury pending full trial on
the merits, (3) preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo preceding the dispute, (4)
the balance of hardships favor the plaintiff, and (5) preliminary injunction is necessary to
93
protect third parties.
E.

Filing and Appealing a Trademark Infringement Claim

Both Federal and State courts have jurisdiction to hear trademark infringement cases
94
State courts
and both use the "likelihood of confusion" standard for infringement cases.

" Id. at § 1125(c)(1)-(2)(B), (2)(C).
8
8

See 4 McCarthy, supranote 11, §24:67, n.8.

Id. (citing Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1689 (7th Cir. 2002)) (This rationale for
antidilution law has not yet been articulated in or even implied by the by the case law. However, Posner
referred to this third type as "pure dilution," exemplified by the sidewalk peanut vendor who adopts the mark
ROLLS ROYCE as a joke. Posner assumed that this use neither tarnishes the famous mark nor injures it by
blurring).
86 Id.
87 Id.

88 Id. at n.10 (The very label "dilution" means that the gist of the U.S. federal anti-dilution law is all about
looking to probable dilutive damage or injury to the plaintiffs famous mark).
" 15 U.S.C.A. § § 1116-1117(a).
9 5 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 30:1 (explaining that monetary damages would not protect the mark holder's
right to control the quality of the goods associated with the mark, therefore, monetary relief for injuries would
not be an adequate remedy); see also id. at 1125(c).
91 5 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 30:1.
92 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116.
9 5 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 30:1.
94 4 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 23:1.50 (noting that federal trademarks law does not preempt its state law

counterparts).
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even rely on federal precedent.9 5 However, the vast majority of Federal Lanham Act claims
are brought in Federal court.96 Claims brought in State court on federally registered marks are
removable to Federal courts by the defendant.9 7 Claims regarding the registrability of a
trademark may be brought to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the "TTAB"). 98 The
TTAB hears and decides adversary proceedings, namely oppositions and cancellations." The
TTAB also handles interference and concurrent use proceedings, as well as appeals of final
refusals issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") Trademark
Examining Attorneys within the course of the prosecution of trademark applications.'
This
administrative tribunal has limited jurisdiction.10' Appeals on its decisions may be brought to
the Federal Circuit or in Federal District court.102
HI.

THE NITRO DECISION

A.

Nitro and Acushnet

Both Nitro and Acushnet were engaged in the golf ball sales business.'0 o Acushnet
was the largest golf ball distributor in the world, and owns the "Titleist" and "Pro-Vi"
trademarks.104 It manufactured, marketed and sold golf balls under this mark. 05 Acushnet
spent a tremendous amount of resources marketing, selling and researching ways to improve
the ball's design. 0 6 Its designs were carefully laid out for a specific performance level of
"distance, spin, feel, dispersion, control, flight qualities, roll characteristics, durability,
performance and appearance."'
Nitro was in the business of recycling and refurbishing used golf balls, many of
which were Acushnet's models, then selling the balls at a discount rate. 09 Nitro dealt with a
substantial consumer demand for recycled and refurbished golf balls.'0 9 In 2001, Nitro
derived $4.8 million of its approximate $10 million in annual sales from refurbished golf

9s

Id.

6 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 32:1.
" Id. at § 32.7.
98 3 McCarthy, supra note 11, at §§ 20:99, 21:1 (explaining T.T.A.B. claims include inter partes proceedings
and ex parteproceedings).
9

9

Trademark

Trial

and

Appeal

Board,

UNITED

STATES

PAT.

AND

https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-application-process/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board
2019).

TRADEMARK

OFF.,

(last visited Sept. 12,

100 Id.

101 3 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 20:99.
Id. at§ 20:106.
103 In re Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948, at *1.
12

104

Id.

105 Id.
06 Id.

107 Id; see also Brieffor Defendant-Appellant, Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356, at *5.
10 In re Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948.
109 Id.
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balls.no The recycling process was far less intrusive on the balls than the refurbishing
process.' As the used balls often had scuffs and marks, they were stripped of their base
coat, clear coat, and markings, then repainted, recoated, and stamped with Acushnet's original
marks during the refurbishing process.11 Acushnet took no issue with Nitro's recycling
process; rather it alleged that the refurbishing process constituted trademark infringement,
counterfeiting, and dilution." 3 At the start of the action, the golf balls were marked
BY
"REFURBISHED
or
CHANCE"
SECOND
BY
"REFURBISHED
GOLFBALLSDIRECT.COM."ll
B.

4

Procedural History at the District Court

Nitro filed this case in the Southern District of Florida, where it alleged that
Acushnet violated the Lanham Act, the Sherman Act, and Florida common law."' Acushnet
answered with several counterclaims, alleging patent infringement and other violations of
6
Federal and State trademark law." During the pendency of the case, Acushnet moved for a
17
preliminary injunction to enjoin Nitro from continuing refurbishment of Acushnet products.'
C.

The District Court's Denial of Preliminary Injunction

The Southern District of Florida, which sits in the Eleventh Circuit, weighs the four
following factors when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) Plaintiffs
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) substantial threat of irreparable injury, (3)
the movant's own injury outweighs injury to non-movant, and (4) that injunction would not
disserve public interest.' 8 Although the court recognized that preliminary injunction is "an
extraordinary and drastic relief," it went on to acknowledge that there had been numerous
9
The most disputed aspect of the District
other cases that granted preliminary injunctions."

110 Id.
"

Id. (Recycled golf balls were only washed and recoated before being packaged for sale).

Id see also Brieffor Defendant-Appellant, Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356 (Acushnet even
provided evidence that Nitro intentionally applied "Pro-V I" to models that were not, in fact, this top-of-the-line
model. Nitro sold different models of golf balls in the same package, creating greater uncertainty as to the level
of performance. Further, Nitro made no effort to repair cuts, gashes, scuffs and abrasions on the used balls.
Nitro's "thick and irregular" application of paint affected the ball's performance, and tests showed that nearly
all balls that Nitro refurbished performed weaker than Acushnet's originals and even used, but washed,
Acushnet products). See Goldstein, supra note 9 (Perhaps most concerning, the Court ignored evidence that the
refurbished golf balls often failed to meet USGA requirements, and Nitro had re-applied the name of other golf
ball manufacturers to products originally produced by Acushnet).
13 In re Nitro LeisureProds., L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948.
112

11

Id.

"s Id. at *1 (Specifically, Nitro alleged that Acushnet had "sought to destroy its used golf ball business by
engaging in false advertising, product disparagement, unfair competition and by attempting to eliminate Nitro
as a competitor.").
116
117

Id.
Id.

I' Id.
"9

Id., at *2 (quoting Davidoff, 263 F.3d 1297, 1300).
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Court's denial was over the first factor: Acushnet's likelihood of success on the merits.12 0 For
Acushnet to succeed on the merits of its trademark infringement and counterfeiting claims, it
needed to prove that (1) its marks had priority, (2) Nitro used its marks in commerce without
Acushnet's consent, and (3) that this use was likely to cause consumer confusion. The court
concluded that the "likelihood of confusion" was the dominant factor. 12 1
The District Court relied heavily on the standard established in Champion for the
resale of refurbished goods.
Champion involved the sale of refurbished spark plugs with
the logo of the original manufacturer, "Champion," still affixed to the reconditioned
product.1 23
The court held that a seller of used products may place the original
manufacturer's mark on a reconditioned item so long as the item was also clearly marked as
used or reconditioned.1 2 4 However, the court carved out a notable exception which has been
the-subject of considerable debate and a litany of litigation:
Cases may be imagined where the reconditioning or repair would be so
extensive or so basic that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its
original name, even though the words "used" or "repaired" were added...
.[t]he repair or reconditioning of the plugs does not give them a new
design. It is no more than a restoration, so far as possible, of their original
condition.1 25
26
Acushnet argued that Nitro's refurbished golf balls met this "extensive repair" exception.1
In support of its claims, Acushnet offered evidence of a study conducted on three
golf ball models that Nitro refinished.1 2 7 The study concluded that Nitro's refurbished
products fell short of Acushnet's in distance, trajectory, weight, and appearance, among other
features.128 The refurbished products fell approximately three percent short of Acushnet's
products.1 2 9 In an industry which heavily advertises distance as a key selling point of its

120

id.

121

Id.

Id. at *4; see also Champion Spark Plug Co., 331 U.S. 125.
In re Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948, at *4.
124 Id. (In doing so, the court reasoned: "[a] trade-mark only gives the right
to prohibit the use of it so far as to
protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his. When the mark is used in a way that
does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth ...
inferiority is immaterial so long as the article is clearly and distinctively sold as repaired or reconditioned rather
than as new . . .. [and] so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product
resulting from wear and tear or the reconditioning by the [refurbisher].").
125 id.
126 id.
127 Id. (The study was comprised of various performance tests done on Pro-V 1,
DT-2-Piece, and DT 100 balls.
As a control, the study used Acushnet's used golf balls, not brand-new ones. Because both sets of balls were
used, the only factor that could affect performance was Nitro's refurbishing process. Nitro rebutted Acushnet's
study with a survey of their own that claimed there was no appreciable difference between the products.)
128 Id.
129 Id.; see also A Review of Driving Distance, USGA, http://www.usga.org/content/dam/usga/pdfl2018/2017distance-rcport-final.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (detailing average driving distances yearly since 1996); see
also Daniel Wilco, How driving distance has changed over the past 40 years on the PGA Tour, PGA.COM,
https://www.pga.com/news/pga-tour/how-driving-distance-has-changed-over-past-40-years-pga-tour
(last
122
123
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products, a three percent difference matters tremendously.1 3 0 To prove consumer confusion,
Acushnet submitted evidence of (1) actual consumer confusion about the processes used to
refurbish the balls, (2) whether Nitro was associated with Acushnet, (3) who actually made
the refurbished golf balls, and (4) that customers were disappointed with the products'
3
performance.' 1
Acushnet also relied on Rolex Watch v. Michel Co., finding that Rolex could enjoin
the seller of modified watches with new bezels and exterior changes bearing the Rolex
32
trademark, because the watches could not be properly called a Rolex.1 Rolex argued that the
reason the watches could not bear the original mark was because the new bezel and exterior
33
Similarly, Acushnet argued that Nitro's
parts affected the functionality of the watch.1
products, so calling them "Titleists"
Acushnet's
of
functionality
substitute parts affected the
134
a preliminary injunction, relying on
to
issue
The Court ultimately refused
was a misnomer.
35
packaging.'
on
its
printed
Nitro
the disclaimer
The District Court also refused to enjoin Nitro's practices in regard to Acushnet's
dilution claim.' 3 6 The Court agreed that Acushnet's mark was famous. 1' After all, the marks
38
Nevertheless, the
have been in use for over 70 years on the industry-leading golf ball.'
to issue an
refused
and
drastic
too
was
sought
the
relief
that
Court summarily decided
'm
Circuit.
Federal
to
the
the
decision
appealed
3
Acushnet
injunction.
D.

The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review and Acushnet's Contentions

On review, the Federal Circuit defers to the substantive and procedural law of the
circuit from which cases originate.141 The case originated in the Eleventh Circuit, which
visited Oct. 22, 2018) (A three percent difference might not sound like much, but that equates to drives ranging
from almost 19 feet shorter (for the average golfer's 210-yard drive in 2002), to fifty-five feet shorter (for the
average tour player's -280-yard drive in 2002)).
12, 2017)
and Pro V1x Comparison, YOUTUBE (Apr.
130 See,
e.g., Titleist, Pro VI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-g6eu9T7EIoE; see also Marc Solomon, In Golf, Distance is Important!,
GOLF MADE SIMPLE (Oct. 14, 2016), https://golfmadesimple.com/blog/golf-distance-important/.
13' In re Nitro Leisurg Prods., L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948 at *6 (Actual customer confusion is "ordinarily
decisive" of the issue of confusion); see also Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp., 1997 WL 244746 at *4 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 20 cmt.

B (AM. LAW. INST. 1995)).

Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1999).
I33 Id.
134 In re Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948, at *4.
13s Id. at *7 (The warning printed on the packaging read as follows: "ATTENTION USED/REFURBISHED
GOLF BALLS. The enclosed contents of used/refurbished golf balls are USED GOLF BALLS.
Used/refurbished golf balls are subject to performance variations from new ones. These used/refurbished balls
were processed via one or more of the following steps: stripping, painting, stamping and/or clear coating in our
factory. This product has NOT been endorsed or approved by the original manufacturer and the balls DO NOT
fall under the original manufacturer's warranty.").
131 Id. (The Court noted that Acushnet had to show the following: "[I]ts marks are famous and that Nitro's
actions have lessened the capacity of the marks to identify and distinguish Acushnet's goods.").
137 Id.
132

130

Id.

I39 Id.
140
141

Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356.
Payless Shoesource, Ine. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 987 (F. Cir. 1993).
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reviews a district court's decision on a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. 1 42
Under this standard, a reviewing court must affirm unless it at least determines that the
District Court has made a clear error of judgment or has applied an incorrect legal standard. 1 43
Acushnet contended that the District Court erroneously relied upon a non-precedential
consent judgment and applied an erroneous legal standard.'4 Specifically, Acushnet took
issue with the District Court's use of a prior consent decree between Acushnet and an
unrelated used golf ball vendor, Birdie Golf Ball Co., Inc.,'1 4 5 and the court's failure to apply
the "material difference" test set forth by Davidoff 14 6
E.

The Majority's Trademark Infringement Decision

Acushnet first argued that the Champion test was the improper legal standard for the
facts of the case, and that Davidoff's "material difference test" was proper.147 The material
difference test is an exemption to the exhaustion doctrine. 14 8 Under the exhaustion doctrine, a
trademark owner's authorized initial sale of its product into the stream of commerce
extinguishes the trademark owner's rights to maintain control over who buys, sells, and uses
the product in its authorized form.1 4 9 Davidoff held that the unauthorized resale of materially
different product containing the trademark can constitute infringement. 150 At the time the
15
Federal Circuit decided Nitro, the material difference test had been adopted by five circuits.s
The test finds its footing in the Lanham Act, which is based upon the notion that materially
different products that have the same trademark may confuse consumers and erode consumer
goodwill toward the mark.15 2
Both Champion and Davidoff sought to define the boundaries of when the use of a
trademark on genuine trademarked goods is no longer permitted.' 53 When deciding Nitro, the
majority noted that the dispute centered around the differences between the new and the

Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C, 341 F.3d 1356; Davidoff, 263 F.3d 1297.
CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 265 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2001).
14 Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C, 341 F.3d 1356.
145 Id. (referencing Acushnet v. Birdie Golf Ball Co., Inc., Case
No. 95-7030-Civ.).
146 Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297 (This case involved a fragrance manufacturer,
Davidoff, that discovered the
defendant had been stripping Davidoff's batch codes from the bottles. Even though the defendant was selling
genuine Davidoff products, the mere removal of the batch codes was deemed a material alteration which
created a likelihood of consumer confusion).
147 Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356.
14' Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297 (Also called the "first sale doctrine", the exhaustion doctrine
provides that resale
by the first purchaser of the original trademarked item is generally neither trademark infringement nor unfair
competition); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1924).
149 Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298 (3rd Cir. 1998).
Iso Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297.
15 See Societe Des ProduitsNestle, S.A., 982 F.2d 633, 644; Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada
Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987); IberiaFoods Corp., 150 F.3d 298, 301; Martin's Herend Imports, Inc.
v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir. 1997); Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco
Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1998).
152 See Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297.
1s3 See Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356.
142
143
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55
refurbished golf balls.15 4 Yet, the court did not apply the material differences test.' Instead,
the majority relied on Champion and found no issue with the standard applied by the District
In doing so, the majority narrowly focused on the factual distinctions drawn
Court.
between Champion and Davidoff."' It reasoned that Davidoff only applied to new goods,
58
The court found that the material differences test
while Champion applied to used goods.
should not apply to used goods because consumers have lower expectations from used
59
products and the material differences test may not accurately measure consumer confusion.
The court did not consider the possibility that Nitro was refinishing Acushnet's products so
extensively that the refurbished golf balls were in fact new products. After all, Nitro was
6
applying their own finishing techniques that materially affected the golf ball's performance.' o
Were that the case, the Davidofftest would be the most applicable.
After determining that the Champion test was the proper standard for confusion, the
majority considered the District Court's application of the rule.'' Acushnet argued that
Champion was inapplicable because "Nitro did not restore 'so far as possible' the used balls
to their original condition, but rather mask[ed] the balls' condition, and second, that by
masking rather than restoring, Nitro ma[de] it more likely that customers will associate
62
Acushnet further contended that Nitro's process was
inferior performance with Acushnet."
responsible for the degraded quality, not normal wear and tear.
The majority disagreed.' 6 " They reasoned that there was no proof of whether the
65
inferior qualities stemmed from normal wear and tear or from the refurbishing process.'
This exact reasoning is what led the Champion court to its decision. Therefore, the Federal
66
Circuit upheld the District Court's reliance on Champion.
Next, the majority pushed aside Acushnet's concerns that the District Court relied
on Birdie.'6 7 Acushnet argued that the District Court relied on this non-precedential decision,

15"
155

Id.

156

id.

Id.

Id.
Id.; see also Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297 (The text of Davidoff never limited its application strictly to new
products).
1s7

1ss

1s9
'6

161
162
163
'"

See Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356.
See In re Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948.
See Nitro Leisure Products,L.L.C, 341 F.3d 1356.
id.
id.
Id. (The majority apparently ignored or discounted Acushnet's study which compared used Acushnet golf

balls and Nitro's refurbished ones. The study found that the refurbished balls performed at a noticeably lower
level).
165

-id

Id.; see also Champion Spark Plug Co., 331 U.S. 125 (In Champion there was no way to prove whether the
deficiency in quality between new and refurbished spark plugs was attributable to the refurbishment process
itself or normal wear and tear).
16

167 See Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356 (A refurbishing process similar to that used by Nitro was
at issue. Birdie was permitted by Acushnet to continue so long as the balls were clearly marked
"USED/REFINISHED BY BIRDIE GOLF." Acushnet argued that the Birdie consent decree predated
the Davidoffcase, was based on a substantially different record from the facts in this case, and was not
controlling on the District Court).
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'

and thus abused its discretion.' 6 8 The majority dismissed this claim because there was no
indication that the District Court in fact relied on Birdie when determining the likelihood of
consumer confusion in the Nitro action, despite the fact that Birdie was cited in its decision.' 69
The majority conceded that the application of the Champion standard results in the
70
second-hand dealer gaining some advantage from the trademark.o
They passed this off as
permissible, so long as the manufacturer's product is not identified with the inferior qualities
pursuant to Champion's exception for excessively restored products.' 7
F.

The Majority's Dilution Decision

The majority reaffirmed that Acushnet's mark is indeed famous.1 72 However, it
upheld the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction due to Acushnet's inability to
demonstrate actual dilution of the mark.1 7 3 During the pendency of Acushnet's appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act "unambiguously requires a showing of actual
dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution." 74 To Acushnet's dismay, the Lanham Act was
amended three years later to only require a likelihood of dilution.'7 5 Ultimately, the Federal
Circuit majority affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction decision. 7 6
G. Judge Newman's Dissent
Judge Newman begins her dissent with a scolding disagreement with the majority.
The following underscores Judge Newman's disdain for the court's unwise choice to apply
the Champion rule:
I can think of nothing more destructive of the value of a famous trademark
than for the law to permit unauthorized persons to re-affix the mark to a
product that is so badly cut, scarred, dented, discolored, and bruised that its
defects have to be concealed before it can be resold as "used"-and then,
with the scars hidden and the surface repainted to look new, the product is
resold with the benefit of the re-affixed trademark and its reputation for
quality and performance. 1

168 See
169
170

id.
Id.; see also In re Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948.
Nitro LeisureProducts, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356.

171

Id.

172

id.

"a

id.

Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
171 Levi Strauss & Co., 633 F.3d 1158.
76 Nitro LeisureProducts, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356, 1366.
174

177 Id.
178 Id.
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Her apprehension towards the rule is well-founded since the majority's decision removes the
trademark owner's ability to control the quality of the products associated with the mark."'
In fact, "the law requires the holder of the trademark to control both the use of the mark and
80
the quality of the goods to which it is affixed, on pain of losing the mark as a trademark."
In the past, the Federal Circuit has determined that a trademark owner who failed to police the
8
quality of goods associated with their mark permitted the generic use of its mark.' ' Once the
82
Judge
mark is generic, the owners of the mark lose their power to police the mark's use.'
Newman foresaw grave consequences for Acushnet and similar mark owners who now risk
83
losing the right to control the quality of goods bearing their marks.'
Judge Newman noted that the balls lost their ability to be uniquely identified with
Acushnet.' 84 The source identification function of trademarks is just as important as, and in
85
fact pre-dates, the quality assurance function.'
The dissent highlighted a key difference: the products at issue in Champion were
86
Nitro was refurbishing
indeed refurbished, but they did not have any concealed defects.'
golf balls with scuff, cart path, and tree marks, no clear coat, discoloration, and other defects
87
Instead of disclosing the severity of the
that materially affect the ball's performance.'
8
In
defects to consumers, Nitro painted over the damage to make the product appear new.'
addition to affecting performance, Nitro's re-painting encumbered the all-important dimples
on the exterior of the ball.' 89 The dissent argued that the used/refurbished notice to
consumers was inadequate.' 90 Further, the dissent highlighted, even if Champion was the
9
proper standard to apply to this case, the court's application was erroneous.1 ' Champion
requires disclosure of the nature of the product to consumers and "concealment [of defects] is
92
the antithesis of disclosure."'
Judge Newman emphasized that trademark law grants Acushnet the absolute right to
She maintained that this was a case of
prevent the re-application of their mark. 1

179

Id.

18o Id.
181 Id.
182

Id.

183

Id.

184

id.
Id. (quoting 2 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 17:8, at 17-10).
186 Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Newman, J. dissenting) (The dissent noted that "the
nature of the refurbishment of a used spark plug is visible; the nature of the damage to a repainted golf ball is
invisible, and any performance-deteriorating defects are permanently removed from view.").
185

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

19 Id. (Judge Newman found that the "used/refurbished notice" does not protect the public so it may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get).
191

Id.

192 Id.

193 Id.
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counterfeiting because Nitro violated Acushnet's right to quality control and further
benefitted from an unauthorized exploitation of the mark.1 94
IV.

THE FEDERAL CIRcuIT's DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

A.

Why the Champion Test Was Unwise to Apply

Champion was predicated on an exemption to the exhaustion doctrine which
extinguishes a trademark owner's rights to protect its mark after the product's initial sale.1 95
Under Champion, the only way to prove infringement for refurbished products is to show that
they have been repaired so extensively that it would be a misnomer to use their original
mark.'9 The Champion rule was intended for application to used products so that full
disclosure of refurbishment would be enough to prevent consumer confusion.' 97 However,
the evidence Acushnet introduced clearly demonstrates that consumers were still confused.' 98
Remember, though, the Champion rule cannot find likelihood of confusion unless the
refurbished goods are so different that it would be a misnomer to use the original
trademark.'" Notably, the Champion test does not look for actual confusion. 2oo Instead, it
assumes that disclosure sufficiently protects trademark rights because consumers presumably
read the warnings, disclosures, and labels on every product they purchase in order to not be
deceived by refurbished products. 20 1 However, a 2016 study conducted by Harvard and
Vanderbilt revealed that consumer warnings are resoundingly ineffective.202 A Pew Research
poll found that only 40 percent of consumers always or almost always read online reviews
203
before purchasing a product.
Because of Nitro's repainting and recoating, the refurbished balls looked like
genuine Acushnet products but poorly performed. 204 As Judge Newman's dissent and other
scholars have noted, Champion's protection for trademark owners simply does not go far
enough.2 0 5 Consumers often purchase products without fully informing themselves, so the
Id. (Because this appeared to be a counterfeiting case, the dissent di-d not address the merits of Acushnet's
dilution claim).
1 See IberiaFoods Corp., 150 F.3d 298, 301 n.4.
19' See Champion Spark PlugCo., 331 U.S. 125, 129.
19

197

Id. at 128.

198 See In re Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 2002 WL 32344948 at *6 (mentioning how Acusbnet submitted

testimony of two consumers, Vickie and Andrew Hasenstaub, who were confused and misled, despite the
warning on Nitro's refurbished products).
1 See Champion SparkPlus Co., 331 U.S. at 129.
200 Id. at 130 ("Full disclosure gives the manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.").
201 Id.

202 Lisa A. Robinson et al., Consumer Warning Labels Aren't Working, HARv. BUS. REV. (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/1 1/consumer-warning-labels-arent-working.
203 Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Reviews, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (December 19, 2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-reviews/ (finding that this percentage drops to 34% for
consumers aged 50-64 and 23% for consumers over 65 and that the average golfer's age is 63).
204 In re Nitro Leisure Products, L.L. C., 2002 WL 32344948,
at *6.
205 See Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C., 341 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Newman,
J., dissenting) (noting that the basic
tenets of the Lanham Act demonstrate that trademark owners need greater control over the use of their marks
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Champion test's reliance on consumer disclosure is ill-founded and unwise for refurbished
206
The bar for likelihood of confusion between new
products with concealed defects.
products and refurbished products with concealed defects must be lowered to properly
conform with the Lanham Act. To accomplish this necessary objective, the Nitro court
2 07
should have tested for consumer confusion using the material differences test.
B.

Why the Davidoff Material Differences Test Was Proper

The underlying value in the material differences test is that trademark owners and
consumers alike may rest assured that goods bearing the trademark will have the attributes
2 08
This test lowers the bar for trademark owners
that the original manufacturer supplies them.
to show infringement because it does not require the refurbished product to be vastly different
from the original.209 The standard is as follows: "[t]he unauthorized resale of a materially
21 0
A material difference is one that consumers
different product constitutes infringement."
21
consider relevant to a decision about whether to purchase a product. ' The material
difference test has been recognized amongst a many circuits.212
The material difference test assures that trademark owners have a greater degree of
control over products bearing their mark because any difference that may dissuade a customer
from purchasing such a product gives the mark owner power to prevent the continued use of
21
their mark in trade.213 The material difference test comports more neatly with the aims of the
Lanham Act and the history of trademark law than the Champion test.214
The Federal Circuit chose not to apply the material differences standard in Nitro
because it interpreted Davidoff narrowly, so as to only apply to new products not refurbished

than what Champion provides); see also Goldstein, supra note 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should have

applied the material differences test); see also 4 McCarthy, supra note 11, §25:39 (noting that the majority
made some generalizations about consumers' expectations when purchasing a refurbished product); see also 4
McCarthy, supra note 11, at §25:39 n.7 (citing Newman's dissent in its contention that the Champion rule
should not apply).
206 The Champion test is still proper for refurbished goods with open and obvious defects. So long as the
defects are visible to the consumer prior to purchase (in other words not covered by packaging) consumers
cannot purchase a product without knowledge of the potential deficiency in quality because they can see the
deficiency.
207 See Davidoff 263 F.3d 1297,
1300.
208 Id. (The theory behind this test is that if the refurbishment imparts any qualities that materially depart from
the original manufacturer's product, the original manufacturer has the right to prevent the sale of goods those
infringing goods).
209 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1302 (This standard is indeed lower: "[b]ecause a myriad of considerations may influence consumer
preferences, the threshold of materiality must be kept low to include even subtle differences between
210
211

products.").
212 See, e.g. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2007);
Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distribution, LLC, 562 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2009).
213 See Enesco Corp., 146 F.3d 1083, 1087 (In fact, the material differences test is often referred to as the
"quality control" exception to the exhaustion doctrine. This name was largely developed by the Second
Circuit).
214 1 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 3:11. (Here, McCarthy outlines some historical purposes of trademarks and
how they were codified in the Lanham Act).
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products.2 1 5 However, the Davidoff court never limited the material differences test to new
products.2 1 6 In fact, the Davidoff court emphasized that the material differences test was
broader.2 17 Because the test is applicable to new and refurbished products, the Federal Circuit
improperly interpreted Eleventh Circuit law and stripped trademark owners of valuable
judicial remedies.
C.

Rolex, an Analogous Case

In some instances where a refurbisher has altered the integral and necessary parts of
a used product, the result is a new product. 2 1 8 In Rolex, a refurbishing company was engaged
in reconditioning Rolex watches and substituting its own parts for genuine Rolex parts. 219
Rolex never gave the refurbishing company permission to leave the signature crown
trademark affixed to the final product, and the replacement parts affected aspects of the
watch's performance such as hand movement, water-proofing, durability, and overall
longevity. 22 0 Although the infringing parts were visible to consumers, they had no way to
know that a watch's performance would be affected by the concealed substitute
components.221 The Court found that the resulting watches were in fact new products
altogether.2 22 Acushnet's case ran factually parallel to Rolex's, except the product involved
was golf balls, not watches. 22 3 Given the identical circumstances between Rolex and Nitro, it
is even clearer that refurbished goods with hidden defects should be treated like new products.
The material differences test, applied in Davidoff to new goods, finds proper application to
altered used goods with hidden defects because they are essentially new goods.
D.

The Federal Circuit's Decision Presents Hazardous Implications

Trademarks not only serve to protect consumers' expectations about products, they
serve a number of important functions at the microeconomic level. 224 Trademarks promote
economic efficiency by reducing the costs of customer's shopping and purchasing
decisions.22 Consumers regularly and rationally rely upon brands to reduce their cost of

213
216
217

Nitro LeisureProducts, L.L.C, 341 F.3d 1356, 1362, 69.
See Davidoff& CIE, S.A., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302.
Id. (In doing so, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the material difference test only applies to

gray market goods. The court noted that other Circuits used the material difference test for regular infringement
cases).
218 Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc.,
179 F.3d 704.

Id. at 706 (Michel Co. sold used Rolex watches with reconditioned, non-Rolex parts, replacement parts, or
generic parts that fit Rolex watches. They replaced the watch bezel, dials, and bracelets. Some of these
replacement parts even had crown logos which imitated Rolex's trademark).
219

Id. at 709.
Id. at 713.
222 Id. at 710
223 Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C.,
341 F.3d 1356, 1358.
224 1 McCarthy, supra note
11, § 2:3.
225 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
(quoting I McCarthy, supra note 11, §
2.01[21, p. 2-3).
220
221
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226
Nitro introduced uncertainty as to the
acquiring information about products and services.
That uncertainty makes consumers
minds.
consumers'
quality of Acushnet's products into
and higher informationunreliability
of
fear
for
products
Acushnet
less likely to purchase
gathering cost.

E.

International Trademark Protection

Professor McCarthy notes that "[i]n free market economies, trademarks are legally
recognized and protected as an inherent feature of the marketplace and of consumer
protection. Even in the formerly highly socialized economies of Eastem Europe and the
USSR, trademarks were legally recognized as contributing to the improvement of quality in
goods." 2 27 In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights recognized a fundamental,
228
Chinese trademark law expressly
proprietary property interest in one's trademark.
prohibits the exact conduct in which Nitro was engaging. Article 57 makes the following
conduct an infringement on the right to exclusive use of a trademark: "[u]sing a trademark
that is identical with a registered trademark on the same kind of goods without obtaining
229
By placing a Titleist logo on
licensing from the registrant of the registered trademark."
non-Acushnet approved products without a license, Nitro was in violation of Chinese
Trademark law. Chinese law also establishes a preliminary extrajudicial dispute resolution
230
This tribunal hears disputes before they reach a
body that resolves infringement disputes.
court of law, provides much-needed judicial economy, and allows decision makers to
specialize in the field.
In the context of dilution claims, European law expressly prohibits dilution and free
riding.231 European Trademark Directive Article 5(2) prohibits unpermitted use of the
plaintiffs mark "where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, [free
riding] or is detrimental to, [dilution] the distinctive character or the repute of the trade
mark." 2 32 Some scholars believe that the United States' anti-dilution law has free-riding
prevention impulses.2 3 3 David J. Franklyn argues that judges are eager to protect trademarks
under an anti-free-riding theory even when there is no proof of actual or likely harm.234

226

1 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 2:5 (Obtaining information about products has costs for consumers. "[A]s

labeling has become cheaper and shoppers' time has become more valuable, branding has increased as a
cheaper means of indicating quality.").
227

Id. at § 2:6.

Burkhart Goebel, Trademarks as Fundamental Rights-Europe, 99 TRADEMARK RPTR. 931, 939 (2009)
(citing Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, Case No. 73049/01 (11 January 2007) (European Court of Human Rights,
228

Grand Chamber).
[Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China]
ifNil)
Zh6nggu6 zhuanli shangbiao (
(Promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983) art. 57 CHINA
229

PAT. & TRADEMARKS.
230 Id. at art. 60 (If dispute resolution is unsuccessful, parties to the dispute may bring suit to the appropriate

court or administrative body).
231 4 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 24:67.
232

id

233 See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-

Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004) (discussing why American
trademark law should adopt a new cause of action for free-riding based upon an unfair competition theory).
234 Id. at 117, 119.
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V.

BALANCING INTERESTS: A SOLUTION TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PROMOTE
BUSINESS

A.

Introduction

In the interest of mark owner and consumer protection, "interior refurbishment"
companies should be required to obtain a license from the trademark owner."' To do so, an
amendment to the Lanham Act is necessary. The amendment should borrow from patent and
copyright law and allow interior refurbishment companies to obtain compulsory licenses from
trademark owners in some limited circumstances. This amendment is necessary in a world
where refurbished goods currently have no quality assurance from the mark owner, and the
market for refurbished goods is so expansive that the practice should not be restricted
altogether by traditional licensing.
B.

Traditional Trademark Licensing

Trademarks may be validly licensed to another, but only if the licensor exercises
control over the nature and quality of the goods sold by the licensee. 2 If the licensor fails to
police the mark's use amongst licensees, it may lose some or all rights in the mark.2 37
Licensors are required to control quality because the trademarked product is not truly
"genuine" unless it has been manufactured and distributed under quality control standards
established by the trademark owner.2 3 8 Trademarks convey an inherent message that the
owner is controlling the goods' quality, so without control the resulting deception forfeits
some rights in the mark's use.23 9
It remains uncertain what extent of control over quality is sufficient to retain legal
protection of the mark. 2 40 According to the Seventh Circuit, "[h]ow much authority is enough
can't be answered generally; the nature of the business, and customers' expectations, both
matter."241 To illustrate, the level of control "retained over children's television program on a
plush doll toy will probably be much less than the extensive regulation system needed for the
license of a famous mark on a system of quick-serve food restaurants."2 4 2 The issue of
whether a licensor has adequately controlled the quality of a licensee's goods is ultimately a
question of fact, which a majority of courts resolve by determining "whether [the licensor
has] control in fact, not whether the licensor possesses the mere right to control." 24 3

23s Goldstein, supra note 9 at 246-47 (Michael Goldstein refers to companies that refurbish goods that will
contain concealed defects as "interior refurbishment" companies).
236 McCarthy, supra note 11, § 18:38.
237 id.
238 Id.
239

id.

Id. at § 18:55 (McCarthy notes that licensors must retain enough control so as to meet consumers'
reasonable expectations when they see the licensed mark appear in the marketplace).
241 Eva's Bridal Ltd. V. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., 639 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2011).
242 McCarthy, supra note
11, § 18:55.
243 See id. at § 18:58 (for discussion on which specific means of quality
control have been deemed adequate).
240
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However, the licensor may not control the quality of a licensee's products so extensively that
24 4
the conduct becomes a violation of federal antitrust laws.
C.

Compulsory Licensing

United States patent law allows compulsory licensing of patents under narrowly
45
One of the most common criticisms against granting compulsory
tailored circumstances.2
licenses is that doing so prevents the patent holder from excluding others from financially
benefitting from the holder's intellectual achievements and labor, thus discouraging
However, the United States allows considerably less compulsory patent
invention. 2 46
247
Similarly, copyright law allows certain
licensing than other industrialized nations.
individuals to obtain "statutory" or "compulsory" licenses in specific ways, subject to the
2 48

obligation to pay royalties.
Compulsory licensing is reasonable in trademark law because the concerns
underscoring disdain for forced licenses in patent law do not have the same weight as applied
to trademarks. The concern that patent holders will be discouraged from invention has no
application to trademarks. Compulsory licenses will allow the original trademark holder to
retain all rights to the creation and innovation of their products, while refurbishment
companies would simply adhere to the enumerated quality requirements. Further, so long as
mark holders are granted an adequate percentage of proceeds from the sale of their licensed
products, they have an incentive to grant more licenses, which will result in more profits.
D.

A Compulsory Licensing Solution

The Lanham Act should be narrowly amended to create a cause of action that allows
interior refurbishing companies to obtain a compulsory license using specific guidelines. It is
crucial that mark holders be afforded an opportunity to argue why the license should not be
granted. Certain factors should determine whether a compulsory license is issued, such as:
financial burden on the mark holder to monitor quality of the refurbished goods; potential
infringement or dilution that may arise if the license is granted; and any other relevant factors
24 9
A compulsory license should not be
specific to the mark and the market in which it used.
issued unless the royalties the licensor stands to gain substantially outweigh their cost and
burden to monitor the licensee's product quality. Further, the final product should still
include a warning to consumers that the goods are refurbished. If the parties cannot agree on
the terms of their license once it has been determined that one should be issued, the presiding
judge should decide the nature and scope of the license. The bar for obtaining a compulsory

244

245

Id. at §§ 18:53, 18:62.
See Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory PatentLicensing Controversy, 9 J. TECH.

L. & POL'Y 117, 121 (2004) (Most commonly, compulsory patents are granted where the patent holder has not
utilized its patent, or the licensee makes a significant improvement to the original patent).
246

Id.

Id.
See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111, 112(e), 114-119, 1003-04; 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 34 (2018).
249 Naturally, a number of important considerations must be included in the amendment. This list of factors
simply reflects the most vital considerations and is by no means exhaustive.

247
248
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license, as well as its scope, should be very high and narrow to preserve traditional trademark
ownership rights.
Additionally, the Lanham Act should be amended to expand the TTAB's
jurisdiction to hear disputes over compulsory licensing. Because the TTAB currently
hears
25 0
similar disputes, it is the most aptly equipped tribunal to handle this new type of claim.
E.

Drawbacks to Compulsory Licensing

Compulsory licensing currently does not have precedent in trademark law, and
limited precedent elsewhere. 25 1 Its disadvantage is apparent-the trademark owner would
have some loss of ownership over their mark. Compulsory licenses would prevent owners
from fully controlling the use of their mark, but the advantages of this proposal dwarf its
downfalls. First, trademark owners are better served by sacrificing a fraction of their rights
than by the current legal precedent, which allows judges to make a trademark generic, thus
stripping an owner's rights entirely. In addition, the amendment must include adequate
safeguards so as to account for trademark owners' concerns regarding the use, future
profitability of their products, and maintenance of good will associated with the mark.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This proposed amendment is necessary because Nitro has not been overturned in
nearly two decades. Nitro's continuing erosion of trademark law must be legislatively
remedied, and this proposed solution resolves the competing interests presented by the
decision, such as the interest in preserving the trademark owner's right to quality control, and
the refurbishment company's interest in operating a profitable business.
Upholding
traditional trademark rights in the interior refurbishment context would kill businesses like
Nitro's. Allowing current refurbishment practices to continue will lead to judicial stripping of
trademark ownership. Not only does this solution uphold the trademark holder's right to
oversee the quality of products associated with its mark, as required by trademark law, it
presents an opportunity for financial gain for licensees and licensors alike.

250

Decisions from the TTAB should still be appealable to a Federal Circuit or District Court.

251

See Jackson, supra note 245.
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